We give a natural extension of Girard's phase semantics of the linear logic [1] to the classical and intuitionistic higher order linear logics and give a uniform phase-semantic proof of the higher order cut-elimination theorem as well as the completeness theorem. Although our proof in this paper is mainly concentrated on the framework of linear logic, the proof technique works for various dierent logical systems uniformly, too. We also extend our phase semantics for provability to phase semantics for proofs, by modifying the phase space of monoid domain to that of proofs domain, in a natural way. The resulting phase semantics for proofs provides various versions of proof-normalization theorem. The details of this extension will appear in the full-version of this paper.
Introduction
Phase space semantics was introduced by Girard [1] for a completeness proof (with respect to provability) of linear logic. Although it was rst introduced as a tool for proving such an abstract property as completeness, it has been recently recognized that phase semantics could be used as a concrete tool to provide some concrete information; For example, when one would like to show \if A is provable, then property P(A) holds" for some concrete property P, it is very natural to try to nd a suitable phase model in which the satisability in that model implies the property P. In particular, the key point of such a method is to set up a suitable phase space (with a desired property) for atoms (atomic formulas) so that the desired property is automatically expanded to the whole phase space universe (for all complex formulas), in the framework of phase model. An elegant example of using this paradigm has recently been shown by Yves Lafont [4] in which provability of A in MALL2 (Second-order Maltiplicative-Additive fragment of Linear Logic without modality) implies acceptability of conguration A 3 (a certain interpretation of A) in a Minsky machine, which provides the undecidability result of MALL2, (the result is extended by Lafon-Scedrov. cf. [4] ). In the rst part of this paper, we shall show another kind of example of the use of this paradigm to give a uniform cut-elimination proof for higher order linear logics. One of the dierences between Lafont's case and ours is that the property P (acceptability of a Minsky machine) of Lafont is a property weaker than the completeness property while our P (cuteliminability) is a property stronger than the completeness, hence our argument implies a strong form of completeness. Our paradigm to use phase semantics has an obvious and close relationship with the Tait-Girard's computability/candidates of reducibility argument c Okada (Girard[3] ) for strong normalization proof, especially when one interpretes this Tait-Girard argument as a general machinery to prove a universal property P on the domain of the proofs as explained in Jouannaud-Okada [6] . It is a very fascinating question whether or not the Tait-Girard strong normalizability argument can be viewed in the phase semantics framework. An armative answer to this question is given: we can extend our phase semantics (for provability) to that for proofs, by modifying the phase space of the usual monoid domain to that of the proofs domain, or even a certain untyped-proofs domain, in a natural way. Then we can view the proofs of various versions of normalization theorem as a natural extension of the phase semantic (strong) completeness proof. We give the idea in the last section of this paper. We shall include more details of this extension in the full-version of this paper.
First and Higher Order Phase Space
In this Section, we rst give a general framework of the phase semantics based on a commutative monoid, due to Girard, in a generalized setting. In particular, we give the second order and higher order phase semantics. We rst give the classical phase space and the intuitionistic phase space, using the notion of closure properties. Then we shall give another requirement on the top of these space in order to obtain a higher order phase space. In the later sections we shall use these phase spaces for a cut-elimination proof. The rst intuitionistic phase space has been introduced by various authors in the literature (cf. Abrusci [12] , Ono [13] , Sambin [14] , Troelstra [15] ). Ours is essentially the same as those, except for the introduction of higher order space.
[The First Denition of Intuitionistic Phase Space.]
An intuitionistic phase space is (P; D; c; ?), where P is a commutative monoid, D is a subset of the power set of P , called the set of facts, and ? is a fact (i.e., an element in D), called the orthogonal. More concrete formulations of the intuitionistic phase spaces can be obtained by specifying the closure operator C above. We give two important denitions of C: The rst one comes from [12] , and the other comes from the earlier version [11] of this paper.
[The Second Denition of Intuitionistic Phase Space.]
The set D P ower(P ) and the closure operator C for any P should satisfy the following condition; P1. C = T 2D (=(=)), and, 2 D i C = .
[The Third Denition of Intuitionistic Phase Space.] We impose the following condition on D; P2. D is closed under arbitrary T .
For any P, C is dened as the smallest 2 D such that , namely, C = T f 2 D : g. Then we also impose the condition C4 above.
It is easily shown that the closure conditions C1-C5 are satised with these two closure operators. Hence the above second and third denitions are the special cases of the rst one. As we shall see later, the soundness and strong completeness theorems of the intuitionistic linear logic hold with any of these three denitions of the phase space.
[The Denition of Classical Phase Space.] A classical phase space is a special case of the intuitionistic phase space (in the sense of the rst denition) in which the closure condition is specied as follows; We rst dene the orthogonal as L5. ? = ?= = fb : for all a 2 ab 2 ?g. Note that ? is also a fact for any . As in the intuitionistic phase space with P1, one need not to put the closure operator for the denition of 0, in fact; L4* 0 = ( ? ) = =.
L5*. 1 = f1g ?? = ? ? L6*. > = P; 0 = > ? L1, L2*, L3*, L5*, L6*, L7 and P3 are the original forms of the denition in Girard [1] . Now we dene the closed and open facts on classical and intuitionistic phase spaces. We rst consider the classical case following Girard [1] . Girard [2] revised the denitions of interpretations of classical modalities ! as:
(cf. Lafont [5] for a more general denition.) Here I = fa 2 1 : aa = ag.
We can take the following denition for the intuitionistic phase space:
In the classical case, ? is dened as the dual of ! as; L8'*. ? = (I T ? ) ? :
On an intuitionistic or classical phase space, as in Girard [1] , the interpretation A 3 of a formula A is dened to be a fact in the following way, when an assignment of facts for (propositional) variables occurring in A is given. We call this value A 3 the inner-value of A through this paper: R 3 is a fact (i.e., 2 D) for atomic R. One can easily extend these interpretations to the case of the rst order quantiers (by interpreting these as additive operators), as usual.
A formula A is said to be true if 1 2 A 3 , where 1 is the unit element of underlying monoid P . Now we extend the above idea to the higher order linear logic. By the higher order linear logic we mean the linear logic extended by the higher order quantiers. We introduce the higher order quantiers as additive operators in the syntax, in the obvious manner.
We rst extend the notion of (propositional) phase space to that of second One can easily extend our phase semantics of the second order linear logic to higher order linear logic of nite types. We give a brief skech of the denition. In this Section, we shall demonstrate our paradigm in a simplest setting | the classical rst order case. Since the one-sided sequent calculus formulation is usually used for the classical linear logic, we shall follow that manner in this section. The two sided sequent formulation is given in the last section, with which both the intuitionistic and classical cases can be treated at once. In the same way as in Girard [ On the other hand, the paradigm through this paper is to consider the following silghtly rened form of the above completeness theorem; The argument similar to the proof of this classical linear logic case will be repeatedly used in later sections.
We construct a specic (canonical) classical phase model for which truth of a formula A implies its cut-free provability. The construction of the phase space is the same as in Girard [1] in his completeness proof, except that we use cut-free provability instead of provability in the denition of kAk below. For any formula A (of linear logic), we dene kAk = f1 : 1; Ag, where`means \cut-free provable". We call kAk the outer value of A in this paper.
We take the commutative monoid on the set of formulas as P; an element of P is a sequence of formulas where a sequence is identied under any permutation; ? = k?k = f1 :`1; ?g; Proof of Main Lemma The proof of this is carried by introduction on the complexity of a formula A.
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It is easy to see that this Main Lemma directly implies the strong completeness; if formula A is true, then 2 A 3 . On the other hand A 3 kAk, hence 2 kAk, which means \A is cut-free provable".
By combining this with the soundness theorem, we have then it is provable without cut.
Okada
Remark: We can actually prove A 3 = kAk if we interprete kAk as f0 : A is provable with the cut rule g, which was the essential part of the original completeness proof by Girard.
On the other hand, we have taken a more restricted interpretation kAk = f0 : A is provable without the cut rule g and show a weaker version of the corresponding lemma (Lemma 2). As we will see below, the form of A 3 kAk is essential when we extend this to the higher order logics.
4 Phase Semantics for Higher Order Linear Logic and the \Candidates of Reducibility" on the Phase Space
In this Section we shall extend the semantical cut-elimination proof of the previous section to the higher order case, using the higher order phase space. In particular, we introduce a notion analogious to Girard's \candidates of reducibility" in his well-known syntactical higher order normalization proof [3] . We shall discuss the correspondence between our cut-elimination proof by phase semantics and Girard's syntactical normalization proof later.
For simplicity of argument, we shall demonstrate the cut-elimination proof based on the second order phase semantics in detail below. The higher order case can be obtained exactly in the same, using the higher order phase semantics, instead of the second order ones. First we can extend the Soundness Theorem in the previous Section in the obvious way. Now we shall prove the Main Lemma for the second order case. As we did for the rst order case, we shall specify one phase space. The denition of the specic (canonical) phase space is exactly the same as before; For any formula A (of linear logic), we dene kAk = f1 :`1; Ag, where`means \cut-free provable in the second order linear logic". Now we consider the phase space based on the commutative monoid composed of the nite sequences of formulas (with the concatenation and 1 = (the empty sequence)), where ? = k?k. As in Girard [1] , we dene G ? = f1 : For any 0 2 G;`1; 0g = f1 : For any 0 2 G; 10 2 ?g.
We consider a domain D composed of any (possibly innite) intersection of the form T kA i k, which makes a rst order classical phase space in the sense of the previous section.
We shall show that this phase space is actually a phase space in the second order sense, namely, satises the additional conditions P4 and P5 above. Now for any formula A, we dene < A > as follows;
The set < A > corresponds to the set of candidates of reducibility of type A in Girard [3] . Then, we can prove; The above denition of < A > satisties the rst condition P4 of the second order phase space. On the other hand, this Main Lemma ensures the second condition P5. Hence our phase space D is actually a second order phase space. By using the Soundness Theorem and Main Lemma together, we can obtain the cut-elimination theorem in exactly the same manner as before. On the other hand, the Main Lemma, of course, implies the Strong Completeness Theorem, as bofore. We can extend this proof of Main Lemma to more general case of higher order linear logic using the higher order phase space, exactly in the same way.
5 Phase Semantics and Cut-Elimination for Intuitionistic Linear Logic
In this section we shall consider propositional and higher order intuitionistic phase semantics and the cut-elimination proof.
For the intuitionistic versions of linear logics, we need to take the sequents of two sided form, as usual. In other words, we consider the formulation of intuitionistic linear logic in which the head (the succedent) of the sequent has at most one formula. If we relax this restriction, as well known, the two sided version of the classical linear logic is obtained. The cut-elimination proof described in this section is, in fact, good for both intuitionistic and (two-sided) classical linear logics without any change; in this sense, the model construction for the strong completeness proof in this section is considered more general than that in the previous two sections. Moreover, a corresponding cut-elimination proof for the traditional (i.e., non-linear) intuitionistic and classical higher order logics is also obtained from our proof in this section without any change; exactly the same proof machinery works for linear intuitionistic, linear classical, non-linear intuitionistic and non-linear classical etc. cases, just by replacing the underlying logical syntax.
The essential change from the setting of the previous two sections (i.e., the setting of one-sided formulation) is this; in the denition of the outer-value kAk of a formula A for the strong completeness proof, we take f01 ? : 0`A; 1g, instead of f1 :`A; 1g. In particular, for the intuitionistic version, this outer-value is of the form f0 : 0`Ag. Here, means \cut-free provable". Following the style of the second concrete denition of the intuitionistic closure operator in Section 2, a fact is dened to be of the form T i23 kD i k. And C is the smallest fact such that . It is easily proved that this denition of facts satises the intuitionistic phase space denition in Section 2. In particular, C4 is provable. (When we follow the style of the rst concrete denition of the intuitionistic closure operator in Section 2, C is dened to be of the form T D2Form (kDk=(kDk=)) and a fact is such that C = . In fact, C is the smallest fact such that in this case, too.) The topolinear space is dened in such a way that a closed fact is of the form However, this change of the form of the main lemma does not aect anything in the proofs of strong completeness and cut-elimination since for that proofs we used only the second half of the statement of the main lemma, which is not changed by the above modication. Hence, from above main lemma, we can conclude; Proof of Main Lemma The proof of this is carried by induction on the complexity of a formula A, as before. We shall show some cases for the rst order setting. The modication to the second order form is exactly the same as in section 3.
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6 Phase Semantics for Proofs, and Phase-Semantic Normalization Proofs
In this Section we extend the phase semantics for provability of the former Sections to that for proofs. We keep the following basic features of phase semantics when extending it.
(i) The facts satisfy certain closure conditions which corresponds to C1-C5 in Section 2.
(We use notation C for the closure of .) (ii) & for facts ; is dened essentially by T (set-intersection).
(iii) 0 for facts ; is dened based on = = ftjt g = ftj8s 2 :t s 2 g for a certain operator , as in Section 2. (ix) The natural extension of the soundness theorem and strong completeness theorem should hold in the form similar to those of the former Sections. The combination of the soundness and the strong completeness should lead to the theorem corresponding to the cut-elimination theorem (of the former Sections), which is now a form of various versions of normalization theorem for proofs. In this paper we mainly consider the following three versions, although one could obtain various other versions of normalization theorem by slight modications; 1. The normal form theorem with respect to the -equality: \For any (typable) proof t, there is a normal proof s such that t = s (t is -equivalent to s)." 2. The weak normalization theorem with respect to the left-uppermost reduction strategy: \For any (typable) proof t, t is weakly normalizable with respect to the left-uppermost reduction strategy." 3. The strong normalization theorem: \For any (typable) proof t, t is strongly normalizable."
The dierent choices of the specic (canonical) model construction (for the strong completeness) imply those three dierent versions of normalization theorem. Moreover, for 1 (the normal form theorem with respect to the -equality), our phase semantic denition does not need the notion of proof-reduction explicitly and all argument can be given in the framework of purely equational theory of proofs (based on the notion of -equality). Here, by -equality we mean the equality induced from the -style conversion for the natural deduction proofs (and the equality induced from the cut-reduction for the sequent calculus proofs). The purpose of this Section is to give a phase semantics denition which has the above properties. More details will appear in the full-version of this paper. It is implicitely intended to show that the Tait-Girard's computability argument and Girard's argument of candidates of reducibility, (for normalization proofs) can be viewed as a framework of the natural generalization of the phase semantic completeness for provability (in the former sections) to that for proofs. Our essential idea is to slightly modify the denition of computability (reducibility) predicates of Girard in order to adjust to the above phase-semantics framework.
We consider the set P of typable proofs as the proofs domain for a phase model. Here we identify the words \type" and \formula". The set of untyped proof is constructed in a natural way by a given syntax (inference rules); an untyped proof is a graphic structure obtained from axiom nodes (for the sequent-style formulation) or open assumption nodes (in the case of the natural deduction formulation) by using inference rules as a new node to like. We also allow that some of the starting nodes (axiom nodes or open assumption nodes) may be labeled by a formula. Hence, an untyped proof in our sense may be partially typed. An untyped proof is called typable if there is a suitable labeling on the unlabeled starting nodes so that the untyped proof becomes a well-formed (i.e., well-matched) linear logic proof. A typable proof in which all starting nodes are already labeled is called a typed proof. When an inference node of an untyped proof t is typable uniquely, say, typable uniquely with type A, we often attach this unique type (formula) A as a label of the node in the drawing of t.
For a intuitionistic phase space for proofs, the proofs domain P is dened in the natural deduction style formulation, while for the classical phase space for proofs, the domain P is dened in the one-sided sequent-style formulation (we also use the proofnet-style representation as an abbreviataion, for simplicity of the representation). Now we dene some basic operators on the phase space domain P. In this section we consider the rudimentary linear logic language rst, then we extend it to the case with modalities and higher order quantiers.
Intuitionistic Case
The domain P of an intuitionistic phase space is the set of of the typable proofs of the natural deduction formulation of the intuitionistic linear logic, which is dened in a naural way. In particular, we have the following logical inferences. (We present these in the typed (i.e., well-matched labeling) form. An untyped version is obtained naturally by deleting the labeling of formulas.) From now on we dene various operators on the domain P. In the course of the denition, we often express an element t of P by t A with a type expression A. This notation should be understood that if t is not (already explicitly) typed, A is ignored when we read it.
We also consider an auxiliary domain P 0 induced from P ; an element of P 0 is obtained from an element of P by indicating a position of open assumption node; namely, P 0 is the set of typable proofs with one indicated position. For t 2 P 0 , and s 2 P (or s 2 P 0 ), t[x := s] means the substitution of s at the indicated position x of t 2 P 0 . (here, the position of the assumption node A is the indicated position of t 2 P 0 .)
Classical Case
For the classical case, the set P of typable proofs are dened in the one-sided sequent calculus formulation in the natural way. We assume that there is one distinguished conclusion node for any typable proof, except for such typable proofs that are constructed from two subproofs by a cut(link) between each distinguished conclusion node of the two subproofs. For the latter proofs, there is no distinguished conclusion node (and the last inference is the cut). As we set up an intuitionistic typable proof, a classical typable proof may be partially typed; namely, some of the axiom(link)s appearing in a typable proof may be already explicitly typed, in other words, some of the axiom(link)s are labeled by two (dual) axiom formulas. When all axiom(link)s are labeled in a proof t, a typable proof t is called (explicitly) \typed". . . . ; A n the environment of t. We follow the notational convension of the intuitionistic proofs for the classical proofs, too; i.e.,when some of the conclusion nodes are not (explicitly) typed, we ignore such A 0 i s when we read; in particular, when all conclusion nodes are not uniquely typable, the proof would be read as the form of the above-right. We may omit the underline when it is obvious in the context. We may use the usual typetheoretic notation (for an (explicitly) typed proofs);
x 1 : A 1 ; 1 1 1 ; x k01 : A k01 ; x k+1 : A k+1 ; 1 1 1; x n : A n`t : A k means t is typed of type A (for the distinguished conclusion node) with types A 1 ; :::; A k01 ; A k+1 ; :::; A n for the environment nodes x 1 ; :::; x k01 ; x k+1 ; :::; x n .
We also use this notation for the intuitionistic (natural deduction) proof, in which case x 1 ; :::; x k01 ; x k+1 ; :::; x n correspond to the positions (nodes) of open assumptions.
Notation: for two proof(net)s t and s with a distinguished conclusion node, t s denotes a proof(net) obtained by making a cut (link) between the two (underlined) distinguished conclusion nodes. We assume the usual reduction relation on the proofs (i.e., -style reductions for the intuitionistic proofs, and the cut-elimination steps for the classical proofs.) Denition 6.2 1. For a proof t, jtj is the untyped proof obtained from t by deleting the type-assignment (i.e., deleting all formulas labeled at some nodes).
2. s = t, s ! 3 t, s ! t means \s is -equivalent to t", \s is -reducible to t", and \s is one-step -reducible to t", respectively. s ! outer t means that s is one-step -reducible to t by the outermost (i.e.,lowest) reduction. The outermost-expansion s ! outerexp t means that t ! outer s. s ! inner t means that s is one-step -reducible to t by the innermost (i.e.,leftuppermost) reduction. Recall that by -reduction we mean the usual -style reduction for the intuitionistic natural deduction proofs and the cut-(elimination) reduction for the classical sequent proofs.
[The First Denition of an Intuitionistic Phase Space] The intuitionistic phase space for proofs is dened in the same way as in Section 2, by the following closure conditions;
For any P and P , C1. C .
We also consider the following slight generalization as C3; C3. If E t then E () C t C , where E is 0 E rule or 8 0 E rule. C4. C 
Here, 1 and & are dened below.
One also needs the following additional closure condition; C6. C is closed under the -equality, i.e., if if t 2 C and s = t, namely t is -equivalent to s, then s 2 C . (Here, by -equivalence we mean the equivalence with respect to the -style conversion for the intuitionistic natural deduction formulation, and the equivalence with respect to the cut-elimination relation for the classical sequent calculus formulation.)
One could replace this C6 by a more general form; C6'. C is closed under the outermost expansion ! outexp , namely, if t 2 C and s ! out t, namely t is obtained from s by a reduction with the outer-most (i.e., the lowest) redex, then s 2 C .
The soundness theorem and various versions of strong completeness theorem (hence various versions of normalization theorem) can be proved with the general form C6'. On the other hand, C6 has a merit that with this form the phase semantics does not require any notion of reduction (-reduction or cut-reduction) explicitly and can be formulated in the framework of equational theory (of proofs). On the other hand, C6 has a demerit that with this form the phase semantic strong completeness implies only a weak form (an equational form) of normalization theorem, namely the normal form theorem with respect to -equality. Without this condition, we need to relax the denition of &, namely need to add the closure C at the denition of & below.
We also need to keep C6 (C6', resp) of the rst denition, as a requirement of the facts in this second denition; C6*. A fact is closed under = .
It is easily shown that the closure conditions C1-C6 are satised with this closure operator.
We could consider the modied version with the condition corresponding to C6', instead of C6* (which corresponds to C6); C6'*. A fact is closed under the outermost expansion ! outexp .
Then it is easily shown that the closure conditions C1-C6' are satised with this closure operator.
Hence a space with this second denition is an intuitionistic phase space in the sense of the rst denition. As we shall see later, with respect to the intuitionistic phase semantics based on the second denition (as well as the rst denition) the intuitionistic linear logic satises the soundness and strong completeness.
Note that the corresponding second denition of C in Section 2 was of the form T 2D (=(=)) (without using the backslash n). This dierence comes from the fact that in the case of phase semantics for provability, the product (i.e., the concatenation) s 1 t is commutative (since the basic domain P is a commutative monoid) and s 1 t = t 1 s, while in the proof domain P of this Section, the substitution relation t[x := s] (or the application relation t's) is not commutative and is sensitive by the order of t and s. This is why we need to dene not only = but also n in this section. A similar situation appears in the case for the phase semantics for provability of the non-commutative linear logic where n is Lambek's backslash-operator (cf. Abrusci [17] ). One the other hand, the phase semantics for proofs for the classical one-sided sequent calculus case, the cut-link behaves as a commutative product, hence one does not need two dierent ?'s and the closure condition can be dened by the double-negation in the same form as in Section 2.
[The Denition of a Classical Phase Space] A classical phase space is dened by using the double-negation ?? for the closure operator C, in the same way as in Section 2;
We rst dene the special fact ? P as an arbitrary set which satises the following closure conditions;
The fact ? should satises the following closure conditions; 1. ? satises C6, namely, ? is closed under = .
The relaxed form (which corresponds to the phase spaces with C6') should be:
1'. ? satises C6', namely ? is closed under the outermost expansion ! outexp .
(Note that a proofnet representation for the classical case is considered as an abbreviation of a sequent proof, so the word \the lowest redex" is meaningful, hence ! outexp is welldened.) 2. For some technical reason we also need to impose a weak form of closure condition under a reduction, too:
If a cut(link) directly connected with an axiom(link) is in t 2 ?, the one-step reduced form of t with this redex is also in ?. With this denition of the classical phase space, it is easily shown that the closure conditions C1-C6 (C1-C5,C6', resp.) of the intuitionistic phase space (the modied intuitionistic phase space, resp.) are satised (with this closure operator C = ??). Here, the condition C3 need to be modied in a natural way since there is no explicite denition of the elimination rules for the one-sided sequent proofs; the corresponding form for the classical case should be Since the classical phase spaces satises all the closure conditions C1-C6(C6') of the intuitionistic phase spaces, in this sense the classical phase spaces are considered as a special case of the intuitionistic phase spaces.
A phase semantics for proofs is dened as follows (uniformly for both the intuitionistic and classical spaces). The soundness theorem holds with respect to (both intuitionistic and classical) phase models. Now we construct the specic (canonical) model for the strong completeness. Our strong completeness theorem implies various forms of normalization theorem. The variation of the normalization theorems comes from the variation of the outer-value (kAk) denitions in the specic (canonical) model construction.
We rst give the outer-value denition for the \normal form theorem with respect to It is easily proved that this M C is a classical phase space. In particular, it is proved that ? = def k?k satises the closure conditions for ?. C is the smallest fact such that A . Now we construct the intuitionistic and classical specic models M I W , M C W for a weak normalization proof, and the intuitionistic and classical specic models M I S , M C S for a strong normalization proof.
[Model M I W ]
We dene kAk = ft: t is typable as type A and is weakly normalizable with respect to the innermost (left-uppermost) reduction strategy g. The intuitionistic specic phase model (constructed in the same manner as in 1 above) with this outer-value is called M I W . It is easily proved that this M I W is an intuitionistic phase space in the sense of the second denition as well as the rst denition (with using C6' instead of C6). E.g., the closure operator C of M I W satises the closure conditions C1-C5 and C6'.
[Model M C W ]
The classical specic phase model (constructed in the same manner as in 2 above) with this outer-value (of 3 above) is called M C W . This is proved to be a classical phase model (with C6'), in the same way as above.
[Model M I S ]
We dene kAk = ft: t is typable as type A and is strongly normalizableg.
The intuitionistic specic phase model (constructed in the same manner as in 1 above) with this outer-value is called M I S . It is easily proved that this M I S is an intuitionistic phase space in the sense of the second denition as well as the rst denition (with using C6' instead of C6). E.g., the closure operator C of M I S satises the closure conditions C1-C5 and C6'.
6. [Model M C S ] The classical specic phase model (constructed in the same manner as in 2 above) with this outer-value (of 5 above)is called M C S . This is proved to be a classical phase model (with C6'), in the same way as above.
The proof of C6' for M I S , M C S is rather involved; For example, in M I S , it is observed that any fact is; 1. closed under the reductions; 2. closed under the weak expansion in the sense that for any fact 8s(t ! s ) s 2 ) ) t 2 .
We can also prove that 3. any element in a fact is strongly normalizable. Then using these lemmas we can prove by induction on the well-founded reduction relation of s that (C6') if s is an element of a fact , and if s ! outexp t, then t is also an element of .
Note that a similar argument also occurs in the standard strong normalization proof of the Tait-Girard method. The following follows immediately from the Strong Completeness.
1. For any intuitionistic (classical, resp.) proof t : A, if t 2 A 3 in M I , (M C , resp.), then there is s such that s = t and s is a normal form of t.
2. For any intuitionistic (classical, resp.) proof t : A, if t 2 A 3 in M I W , (M C W , resp.) then t is weakly normalizable.
3. For any intuitionistic (classical, resp.) proof t : A, if t 2 A 3 in M I S , (M C S , resp.), then t is strongly normalizable.
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On the other hand, by the Soundness Theorem the conditions of 1, 2 and 3 above are all satised. Hence, Theorem 6.7 The Strong Completeness for M I (for M C ; M I W ; M C W ; M I S ; M C S , resp.) implies the normal form theorem with respect to the -conversion for the intuitionistic linear logic (that for the classical linear logic, the weak normalization theorem for the intuitionistic and classical linear logic, the strong normalization theorem for the intuitionistic and classical linear logic, resp.) . Now we sketch how to extend our phase models to the case with the modalities and second order quantiers.
With the presence of modalities, the notion of position x in t(2 P ) is modied: Position x can indicate not only a unique node but also multiple nodes if the nodes are marked with ! for the intuitionistic case (and marked with ? for the classical case). Here, the (untyped) proofs domain P is extended by the modality inference nodes (and a mordality mark may be attached on some open assumption positions (for the intuitionistic case) and on some environment positions (for the classical case)) in a natural way.
Then the denition of t[x := s] is modied with this new notion of position.
As for the modality, the \uniform interior" I is dened as; Note that the interior of is dened in the manner similar to the case of phase space for provability; The modality ? is also dened in the way similar to the case for provability. Namely, for the classical case, it is dened with the De Morgan dual of !. Or, one could directly dene by ? = ((( ? ) ) ! ) ? . The intuitionistic ? can be dened in the same nammer as in Section 2.
This notion of candidates corresponds to the notion of candidates of reducibility in the sense of Girard [3] .
Using this denition of the candidates sets we can extend the six rst order specic models to the corresponding six second order specic models. Then the Strong Completeness Theorem can be relativized with the candidates, in the same way as in the previous sections for \provability".
The It is also proved that each six specic models are actually second order phase models, in the same way as in the rst order case with the help of the above Strong Completeness. Then the second order six specic models (with the help of the Soundness) provide the intuitionistic and classical normal form theorem with respect to -equality, weak normalization theorem, and strong normalization theorem, respectively in the same form as Theorem 6.7.
Remark on the alternative denition of the intuitionistic 0 : Our denition of 0 above needed the colsure operator in the form (=) C . This is because, on the contrary to the case of semantics for provability, the closure condition C4 does not implies (=) C = (=) for facts ; ; this is due to the fact that the concatenation operator t[x := s] for the denition of = and the concatenation operator t 1 s for the formulation of C4 are quite dierent, while those two were the same operator in the case of semantics for provability. An alternative denition of = is to use the application operator t 0 s where t 0 s means the use of 0-elimination rule. Using this form of concatenation for the denition of = (and the obvious denition of dual n, one could dene 0 = = without the closure operator. However, instead, we need to impose a stronger condition on the denition of facts (to prove the Soundness Theorem); for example, one need to assume a certain kind of normalizable property on each fact; for example that for any element t of a fact , there is a normal proof s 2 such that s = def t, on the top of C6. Then the notion of phase model becomes closer to the specic (canonical) model denition itself.
